The Security Budget and Machinery of Government: Opportunity Costs and Balancing the Budget
Inevitably, any decisions regarding security have financial implications and necessitate hard choices. The heightened military commitments, coupled with budget and force reductions of the past ten years have led to serious overstretch in the Armed Forces, especially the army, with consequences for recruitment, retention and re-equipment, not to mention any long-term commitment to keep troops in Afghanistan. Defence inflation far outstrips the retail price index, as military equipment becomes increasingly high-tech. There is already a stark gap between projected defence expenditure and future commitments for major weapons systems. The defence budget is lower as a percentage of GDP than it has been for 75 years and, hence, the resources devoted to the armed services will have to be increased significantly if the UK wishes to have power projection of any significance. Conversely, conflict prevention might lead us to devote more resources to DFID for international aid, though it might equally necessitate continuing levels of expenditure for the military. Liberal Democrats have called for a strategic defence review to assess the balance between our objectives, capabilities and resources. It is timely to consider whether we need to expand such a review to cut across all departments with security responsibilities, including DfiD, MoD, FCO and the Home Office, and how can we bring these departments together to operate more effectively?
- What role should our armed forces play in the 21st Century? What are the spending implications of these choices? Is there a case for reducing the defence budget and re-deploying resources into other means to prevent conflict?
- Should Britain still seek to maintain a full range of weapons systems and capabilities, with the defence budget increased commensurately? Or should we seek to maximise the effectiveness of limited resources in this field by role specialisation and greater integration with our partners and allies? Are we procuring the right equipment and should we be doing this alone or with our allies?
- How can we generate more co-ordinated responses to security challenges, bringing together the MOD, FCO, Home Office and DFID? What scope is there for cross-departmental budget lines e.g. a global conflict prevention pool. Possible cross-Whitehall security budget. What is the future for the PCRU (now stabilisation unit) situated within DfID? The Conservatives are proposing a Cabinet-level Security minister. Is this a helpful proposal?
March 29th, 2008 at 1:29 am
25. Their role should be readiness to repel enemy attack on or invasion of the UK itself, and join with allies in helping to promote peace and stability in, but not necessarily only in, the region of Europe. The defence budget must be adequate to meet whatever this will cost.
26. The Trident nuclear weapon system is dangerous, expensive and useless and should be scrapped. The UK should listen to its military experts in the armed forces rather than let procurement be run by the MOD which appears to need drastic reform, nor should BAE Systems enjoy the influence it has.
27. The departments will tend to preserve their own fiefdoms and budgets. Ways are needed to stop this happening. Cross-departmental budget lines sound good. And if they are the wrong people for the job, sometimes you have to change the people. But surely it’s no use just reorganising the civil service departments. Ask the military and the people who implement responses to security challenges in the field. A security minister sounds not helpful but gimmicky. All these issues are too much for one politician.